Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa at c. 3,300 km and a productive upwelling region off the Horn providing significant potential for offshore tuna fisheries development. The abundant and diverse marine resources, including seabirds, whales, whale sharks, and several dolphin and turtle species offer promise for ecotourism. This promise, however, stands in stark contrast to current political realities which have developed since the fall of President Siad Barre's regime in 1991 leaving the country without a central government and its waters unrepresented by a recognizable state in the community of nations. Since there is no one particular political entity that controls Somali waters, each coastal region has self-promoted militia, led by a faction leader, which controls its own area, with some entering into controversial fishing vessel licensing arrangements with foreign countries. Somalia's coastal and offshore waters are now dangerous for the innocent passage of yachts and commercial vessel traffic, and foreign fishing vessels operating in Somali waters are at risk of being boarded by militia and having their crews taken hostage. Somali militia, operating from speedboats and posing as coastguard, have worked out the profitability of "coastal patrolling" which includes kidnappings, vessel seizures and ransom demands, all enforced by frequent use of mortars, grenades and small arms.
With the breakdown of civil society, Somalia has degenerated into a no-man's land subject to clan or Islamic Shari'ah law. Owing to continuing unrest in the south, a central government is unlikely to evolve soon. In its place, a decentralized federation of regional political entities has emerged, including the self-proclaimed but unrecognized Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, the self-proclaimed Puntland State in the northeast, Jubaland in the south near Kismayo, and a future Banadir regional administration around Mogadishu when warlords Hussein Aideed (son of late General Farah Aideed) and Ali Mahdi settle their differences. Years of internal conflict have damaged infrastructure in the fishery sector and rendered ineffective any previous oil spill response capability, aids to navigation, and search and rescue capacity in a region of high tanker/cargo traffic to and from the Suez Canal through the Gulf of Aden and calling at Mombasa, the East African shipping hub.
Piracy Experiences
The international community encourages local Somali administrative entities to take responsibility for governance of the region, but when authority is exerted over coastal waters the individuals are labelled pirates. Several incidents involving foreign fishing vessels and cargo vessels arrested by pirates in Somali waters have been reported recently.
September 30, 2008: The seizure by Somali pirates of a Belize-registered vessel which was carrying military arsenal to Kenya is a wake-up call to the international community.
The pirates are not only a threat to international commerce as we know it, but also show how the war in Somalia has spilled beyond its international borders.
While the free movement of cargo has always been the heart of international commerce, freight movement off the Somali waters is going to become complex, risky and expensive.
Merchant ships had previously been attacked, paid ransom and released.
This not only set a bad precedent but also sent a signal to the pirates that it was a way of life. We watched as they snowballed from rag-tag bandits to sea-pirates.
The world also watched as the pirates upped the game, and now they have acquired deadly arsenals and are ready to launch multi-million dollar demands.
The hijacking of the ship with military hardware destined for Kenya is thus not an isolated incident but part of what today drives the thuggish economy of the war-torn Somalia.
As has been pointed out, the small arms in the ship —if they are whisked away— could tilt the balance of power in the war -torn country. Kenya has put it strongly that it cannot, and will not negotiate with terrorists. And that is the way forward. Crime should not pay and should never pay in our international waters.
The world cannot sit back and allow extortionist gangs to freely roam international waters leading to and from the Horn of Africa.
Recently, a Germany ship owner Niels Stolberg made the mistake of paying $1.1 million to recover his $23 million freighter.
It is such payments that have made the pirates increase their attacks hoping to get more maritime prizes.
September 22, 2008: Armed pirates have attacked and hijacked another Greek-owned cargo ship in the eastern coast of Somalia, taking all 19 crew members as hostage, an anti-piracy watchdog said today.
The attack comes just five days after pirates hijacked another Greek bulk carrier within the same area. Four pirates in three speedboats launched an attack on the boat, which was flying a Bahamas flag, before boarding and hijacking the carrier.
The attacks in the eastern cost are more dangerous, because it's open seas. To patrol this open area is not as easy. This needs concerted effort by the United Nations.
Three days later, another Greek-owned bulk carrier cargo ship carrying 25crew was attacked by pirates off the eastern coast of Somalia.
Pirates have captured dozens of ships around the Horn of Africa this year, making the waters off Somalia the most dangerous in the world. "The pirates are continuing because there are no major deterents," said Choong. Sunday's hijacking pushes the number of attacks this year in Somali waters to 56. Some 20,000 ships pass annually through the Gulf of Aden, which connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
